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THE UNITED STATES' USE OF
DRONES IN THE WAR ON TERROR:
THE (IL)LEGALITY OF TARGETED
KILLINGS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
Milena Sterio'
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
United States government began to use drones against al-Qaeda
targets. According to several media reports, the United States
developed two parallel drone programs: one operated by the
military, and one operated in secrecy by the CIA. Under the
Obama Administration, the latter program developed and- the
number of drone attacks in countries such as Pakistan and
Yemen has steadily increased. Because the drone program is
operated covertly by the CIA, it has been impossible to
determine the precise contours of the program, its legal and
normative framework, and whether its operators have been
lawfully implementing the program. This article focuses on four
distinct issues linked to the United States' use of drones: the
definition of the battlefield and the applicability of the law of
armed conflict; the identity of targetable individuals and their
status as combatants or civilians under international law; the
legality of targeted killings under international humanitarian
law; and the location and status of drone operators. This
article concludes that the Obama Administration, as well as any
future administrations, should consider installing military-led
drone operations, which would be subject to public scrutiny to
ensure that the rule of law remains the guiding principle of the
United States' use of force abroad.
* Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. The
author would like to thank the Case Western Reserve University School
of Law, and in particular, the Frederick K. Cox International Law
Center, for the opportunity to present this paper at the September 7,
2012 annual conference entitled "Presidential Power, Foreign Affairs,
and the 2012 Election."
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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ON THE USE OF
DRONES
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, President George W. Bush, in
his capacity as Commander-in-Chief, authorized the use of drones
against leaders of al-Qaeda forces, pursuant to Congress'
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF).1 Pursuant to
AUMF, drones could be utilized against al-Qaeda forces to target or
to kill enemies. It has been reported that the United States possesses
two types of drones: smaller ones, which predominantly carry out
surveillance missions, and larger ones, which can carry hellfire missiles
and have been used to conduct strikes and targeted killings.' Drone
strikes have been carried out by both the military as well as the CIA.
As Jane Mayer famously noted in her article:
The U.S. government runs two drone programs. The military's
version, which is publicly acknowledged, operates in the
recognized war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets
enemies of U.S. troops stationed there. As such, it is an
extension of conventional warfare. The C.I.A.'s program is
aimed at terror suspects around the world, including in
countries where U.S. troops are not based.'
1. S. J. Res. 23, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted). This article, perhaps
regrettably, does not examine issues related to AUMF, to the legality of
the drone program under AUMF, or any constitutional issues linked to
the exercise of broad military powers by the executive branch.
Moreover, this article utilizes the term "drone." Other terms used in
academic debate include "unmanned aerial vehicles" and "remotely-
piloted aircraft." While the latter two may be more technologically
accurate, this article adopts the popular term "drone."
2. See Ryan J. Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 101, 104 (2010).
3. Jane Mayer, The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the C.LA.'s
Covert Drone Program?, THE NEW YORKER, http://www.newyorker.co
m/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fafactmayer (Oct. 26, 2009).
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Moreover, although the President had designated Afghanistan and
its airspace as a combat zone, the United States has used drones in
other areas of the world, such as Yemen, where al-Qaeda forces have
been targeted and killed.' In fact, the U.S. approach for the use of
drones is that members of al-Qaeda forces may be targeted anywhere
in the world: that the battlefield follows those individuals who have
been designated as enemies due to their affiliation with al-Qaeda.6
While many in the international community have criticized the
United States' expansive geographical use of drones against al-Qaeda
forces,6 officials in the Bush Administration have defended the drone
program as consistent and conforming to international law.' President
Obama has continued this approach and has expanded the use of
drones in the war on terror.' Moreover, high-level officials in the
Obama Administration have offered detailed legal justifications for
the legality of the American drone program.
Harold Koh, State Department Legal Advisor, justified the use of
drones at the American Society of International Law Annual Meeting
on March 25, 2010, arguing "it is the considered view of this
Administration . . . that U.S. targeting practices, including lethal
operations conducted with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles,
comply with all applicable law, including the laws of war."9 In his
speech, Koh cited both domestic law (AUMF) and international law
as proof that the United States is engaged in armed conflict with al-
Qaeda, the Taliban, and "associated forces."10 Targeted killings,
according to Koh, are justified because they are performed in
4. Michael W. Lewis & Vincent J. Vitkowsky, The Use of Drones and
Targeted Killing in Counterterrorism, 12 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y
PRAc. GROUPS 73, 73 (2011).
5. See id. (noting that under this approach, "al Qaeda terrorists who
continue to plot attacks may, in appropriate circumstances, be lawful
subjects of armed attack without regard to their location").
6. One of the most vocal critics of the drone program has been Professor
Mary Ellen O'Connell. See, e.g., Mary Ellen O'Connell, Remarks, The
Resort to Drones Under International Law, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 585, 592 (2010). See also Hina Shamsi, Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and the Modern Challenges to Use of Force Law, 104 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 161, 166-68 (2010) (demanding the United States provide a
detailed analysis to the general public justifying its killings abroad).
7. See Lewis & Vitkowsky, supra note 4, at 74.
8. Id. at 73.
9. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, Address at the
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law 14,
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/179305.pdf
(Mar. 25, 2010).
10. Id.
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accordance with the laws of war." In other words, the United States
conducts targeted strikes consistent with the well-known principles of
distinction and proportionality to ensure that the targets are
legitimate and collateral damage minimized."
Koh offered four reasons supporting the legality of targeted drone
killings. First, enemy leaders are legitimate targets because they are
belligerent members of an enemy group in a war with the United
States. 13 Second, drones can constitute appropriate instruments for
such missions, so long as their use conforms to the laws of war.' 4
Third, enemy targets are selected through "robust" procedures; as
such, they require no legal process and are not "unlawful
extrajudicial" killings." Finally, Koh argued that using drones to
target "high level belligerent leaders" does not violate domestic law
banning assassinations.'6
The Obama Administration has continued to use drones in
Pakistan, as well as in Yemen. Increasingly, however, the American
drone program has been run by the CIA." Leon Panetta, the CIA
Director, has praised the drone program stating that drones were "the
only game in town.""' On September 30, 2011, a CIA-operated drone
targeted and killed an American citizen in Yemen, Anwar al-Awlaki. 9
Al-Awlaki had been accused of holding prominent roles within the
ranks of al-Qaeda and had been placed on a hit list, authorized by
President Obama.20 His assassination marked the first time in history
an American citizen had been targeted abroad without any judicial
involvement or proceedings to determine guilt of any crime.
In a subsequent speech, Attorney General Eric Holder confirmed
the Obama Administration's view on the legality of targeted killings,
including killings of American citizens. On March 5, 2012, in a speech
at Northwestern University, Holder claimed targeted killings of
American citizens are legal if the targeted citizen is located abroad, a
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 15.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See Mayer, supra note 3.
18. U.S. Air Strikes in Pakistan Called "Very Effective," CNN, http://ww
w.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/ (May 18,
2009, 6:48 PM).
19. Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBS, http://www.cbs
news.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html (Sept. 30, 2011, 1:22 PM).
20. See Lewis & Vitkowsky, supra note 4, at 75.
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senior operational leader of al-Qaeda or associated forces, actively
engaged in planning to kill Americans, poses an imminent threat of
violent attack against the United States (as determined by the U.S.
government), and cannot be captured; such operations must be
conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war
principles.2'
Despite Koh's and Holder's justifications, many have questioned
the legality of the American use of drones to perform targeted killings
of al-Qaeda members and of U.S. citizens. Philip Alston, UN Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, has
famously stated his concerns that drones "are being operated in a
framework which may well violate international humanitarian law and
international human rights law."2 This article highlights some of the
most relevant issues surrounding the (il)legality of targeted killings
under the current approach of the Obama Administration. This
article concludes that most targeted killings are illegal under
international law; only a very small number of such killings,
performed under carefully crafted circumstances, could potentially
comply with the relevant rules of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and
only if one accepts the premise that the United States is engaged in
an armed conflict against al-Qaeda. This article discusses the
following issues related to the use of drones to perform targeted
killings: the definition of the battlefield and the applicability of the
law of armed conflict (Part II); the identity of targetable individuals
and their status as combatants or civilians under international law
(Part III); the legality of targeted killings under international
humanitarian law (Part IV); and the location and status of drone
operators (Part V).
II. WHAT AND WHERE IS THE BATTLEFIELD? WHICH LAWS
APPLY?
Under the Bush Administration approach, the United States post
9/11 was engaged in a global war against terrorists. Under this
expansive approach, the war had no geographic constraints, and the
battlefield was of a global nature.n In other words, the war followed
21. See Eric Holder, Attorney General., U.S. Dep't of Just., Speech at
Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 2010), available at
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-
1203051.html.
22. US Warned on Deadly Drone Attacks, BBC, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/8329412.stm (Oct. 28, 2009, 5:40 PM).
23. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 6, at 595 (noting that under the Bush
Administration approach, "we could kill al Qaeda members if they were
in the U.S., Germany, Switzerland, and elsewhere based on a suspect's
presence").
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the terrorist enemies, and wherever they were located was where the
battlefield could be temporarily situated. According to the Bush
Administration, as well as the U.S. Supreme Court case Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, the United States was at war against al-Qaeda and Taliban
forces, and the applicable laws were the laws of war.14 Thus, military
force, including the use of drones, could be used if consistent with the
laws of war.
Under the Obama Administration, the rhetoric has slightly
changed: the United States is no longer engaged in a global war on
terror but rather, in a war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces .2  However, the Obama Administration, by
conducting drone strikes in a variety of locations, including Pakistan
and Yemen, has followed the Bush Administration view of the global
battlefield. The Obama Administration believes, like the Bush
Administration, that the laws of war apply to the use of drone strikes
because the United States is engaged in an armed conflict. 26 Moreover,
the Obama Administration has claimed drones can be used in
countries that harbor terrorist enemies and are unwilling or unable to
control territory where such enemies are located.27 This rationale
would likely exclude places like England and France from the possible
definition and localization of the battlefield, but would purport to
justify the use of drones in places like Pakistan and Yemen, where
remote territories are hard to control and where central governments
cannot claim to possess effective control.'
24. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 107 (noting that "the Executive
Branch has consistently characterized the current conflicts to be armed
conflicts, governed primarily by the lex specialis of the laws of war" in
both the Bush and Obama Administrations); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548
U.S. 557, 630-31 (2006) (characterizing the conflict with al-Qaeda as
armed conflict to which the laws of war apply); see also Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518-
19 (2004).
25. See Koh, supra note 9, at 13-15 (identifying al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces as targets of U.S. operations).
26. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 107.
27. Koh, supra note 9, at 14 (noting that the decision of "whether a
particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend
upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the
imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved,
and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the
target poses").
28. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 130-33 (discussing the location of the
strikes, concluding that strikes can most likely be lawfully conducted in
places of "hot conflict" like Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, but
questioning whether the United States would ever opt for strikes in
more neutral places such as Kenya, the Philippines, or Saudi Arabia).
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The above described terminology ("global war on terror" and
"war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces") is vastly
important, as it designates the applicable legal framework surrounding
targeted killings and drone strikes. If one accepts the premise that the
United States is engaged in armed conflict against al-Qaeda terrorists,
then one has to conclude that laws of war apply.29 If laws of war
apply, then the rules of jus ad bellum determine whether military
force is utilized in a lawful way. In fact, laws of war permit targeted
killings if two particular requirements of jus ad bellum are satisfied:
the use of force is necessary and the use of force is proportionate.
First, a state resorting to force must prove its decision to resort to
force was a result of an armed attack and necessary to respond to
such attack.30 It is possible to argue that al-Qaeda's campaign of
terrorist attacks against the United States, including 9/11,
corresponded to an armed attack. However, it is also possible to argue
that "al Qaeda's campaign against the United States does not trigger
the right of self-defensive force . . . because al Qaeda has not launched
a full scale military offensive."" Another difficulty in this context is
that al-Qaeda is not a state, and under traditional international law,
only states could initiate armed attack against states, thus triggering
the right to self-defense." While some commentators have argued that
the use of force in self-defense against a non-state actor should be
29. An additional inquiry here is whether the United States is engaged in an
international armed conflict, or in an internal armed conflict against al-
Qaeda. International armed conflicts are governed by the 1907 Hague
Conventions, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, customary law, and
the first Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Non-
international armed conflicts are governed by Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions, custom, domestic law, and the second Additional
Protocol to the Geneva Conventions. Some have even suggested the
existence of a third category of internationalized non-international
armed conflicts. For a more detailed discussion of these issues, see
Vogel, supra note 2, at 110-14. This inquiry goes beyond the scope of
this article; moreover, this inquiry is not dispositive of the issues posed
by this article, which will refer to all of the above-mentioned
conventions. It should be noted that the Obama Administration has
taken the position that the United States is engaged in a non-
international armed conflict against al-Qaeda, Taliban, and their
associated forces. See Koh, supra note 9, at 12.
30. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 196-200 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua case].
31. Andrew C. Orr, Note, Unmanned, Unprecedented, and Unresolved: The
Status of American Drone Strikes in Pakistan Under International Law,
44 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 729, 737 (2011).
32. Sikander Ahmed Shah, War on Terrorism: Self-Defense, Operation
Enduring Freedom, and the Legality of U.S. Drone Attacks in Pakistan,
9 WASH. U. GLOBALlSTUD. L. REV. 77, 93-94 (2010).
203
CASE WESTERN REsERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -VOL. 45 -2012
The United States' Use of Drones in the War on Terror
permissible, "[ijn an era where non-state groups project military-scale
power,"3 3 this view remains controversial."
Second, a state resorting to the use of force must prove its use of
force was proportionate to the military campaign's objective.35 The
proportionality test of jus ad bellum should "be applied contextually,
to determine whether the overall goal of a use of force . . . is a
proportionate objective.""6 Because the CIA operates the drone
program in Pakistan in secrecy, it is impossible to determine
conclusively whether the program meets the proportionality
requirement of jus ad bellum. It is possible to argue the resort to
targeted killings through the use of drones is at least sometimes
necessary and proportionate (for example, when a U.S. military
commander possesses information that a high-value al-Qaeda
operative, engaged in planning armed attacks against Americans, is
located in a specific location which is relatively easily reachable via
drones, and the commander decides that neutralization of the al-
Qaeda target is necessary to prevent attacks against Americans). It is
probable that many drone strikes do not meet the requirements of jus
ad bellum, but it is nonetheless difficult to conclude, under this
approach, that the entire drone program is per se illegal. Should the
U.S. government-specifically the CIA-release more facts regarding
the drone program, it may become plausible to assess the lawfulness
of this type of force through the jus ad bellum prism.
If, however, one rejects the conclusion that the United States is
engaged in armed conflict, then the legality of the entire drone
program becomes questionable. One could logically conclude the
United States is not fighting a true war, but chasing terrorists. Under
this view, the law of armed conflict would no longer apply, and the
United States could use force against such terrorists only under a law
enforcement paradigm-only when the use of force is absolutely
necessary. Moreover, if the laws of war do not apply, then
international human rights law dictates that targeted killings are legal
only if a threat imminent and the reaction necessary, because under
human rights law, "it is never permissible for killing to be the sole
33. Orr, supra note 31, at 739.
34. For one of the leading opponents of the view that al-Qaeda forces, as a
non-state actor, can launch an armed attack within the meaning of
Article 51 of the UN Charter (self-defense), see Mary Ellen O'Connell,
Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004-
2009, at 13 (Notre Dame L. Sch., Research Paper No. 09-43, 2010).
35. For a detailed analysis of the proportionality test under jus ad bellum,
see Nicaragua case, supra note 30, 194, 237.
36. Orr, supra note 31, at 738 (quoting Robert D. Sloan, The Cost of
Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in
the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE INT'L L. 47, 69 (2010)).
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objective of an operation."3 "[A] killing is only legal to prevent a
concrete and imminent threat to life, and, additionally, if there is no
other non-lethal means of preventing that threat to life."' The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
prohibits "arbitrary" killing, as well as punitive or deterrent killings of
terrorists.39 The very nature of the American drone program, where
targeted killings are utilized to neutralize al-Qaeda operatives, even
though such killings are not absolutely necessary, is contrary to
international human rights law. Under this paradigm, one must
conclude that the drone program is illegal.
III. WHo ARE THE TARGETS?
The second question related to the use of drones has to do with
the targets themselves: who can be targeted and under what
circumstances? This issue depends on the above-mentioned inquiry
about the nature of the conflict with al-Qaeda. If the United States is
engaged in an armed conflict and the laws of war apply, then lawful
combatants can be targeted, unless they have surrendered and are
hors de combat.40 Lawful combatants are defined in the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions
37. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on Targeted Killings, 33,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010).
38. Sebastian Wuschka, The Use of Combat Drones in Current Conflicts-
A Legal Issue or a Political Problem?, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 891,
898 (2011).
39. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6(1), Dec. 19,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR; see also Consideration of
Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Israel, 15,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR (Aug. 21, 2003) (discussing the
committee's concerns with targeted killings).
40. See Wuschka, supra note 38, at 898; see also Lewis & Vitkowski, supra
note 4, at 73 (noting that combatants may not be targeted if they are
hors de combat). Another relevant and interesting issue raised by the
rule that combatants may not be targeted if they are hors de combat
can be illustrated by the following hypothetical: what if al-Qaeda
combatants (in the true sense of the word) are targeted by a drone
strike attempt to surrender, by waving a white flag a few seconds after
they realize that they are being pursued by a drone? Is the drone
operator under a legal obligation to abort the targeting operation
because the combatants are no longer engaged in combat? To the extent
that drone technology does not allow for this outcome, because the
drone operator at that point no longer possesses the capability to halt
the operation, do drones become unlawful weapons? This question
remains outside the scope of this article but will hopefully remain the
subject of many academic debates and scholarly writings in the future.
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as all members of the armed forces of a state party to a conflict.4 1 In
fact, under Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, lawful
combatants are either members of a state's armed forces or militia,
report to a responsible chain of command, distinguish themselves by
wearing distinctive signs or uniforms, carry arms openly, or conduct
their actions in compliance with the laws and customs of war. 2
Individuals who do not qualify as lawful combatants are civilians and
may never be targeted.43
Under the laws of war, al-Qaeda members can be targeted if they
qualify as lawful combatants; if not, then they are civilians and are
protected from military strikes. If one accepts the premise that the
United States is engaged in armed conflict, then one should logically
have to conclude that al-Qaeda members are lawful combatants-
otherwise, the characterization of the conflict as true war makes little
sense. After all, the United States cannot be the only true warrior in
the armed conflict against al-Qaeda. This conclusion is easily
reachable if one adopts a looser interpretation of the Geneva
Conventions by recognizing that in most modern-day wars members
of armed forces do not always wear uniforms and carry arms openly.
Unlike World War II, modern-day wars are fought by armies and
militias that may appear civilian and may not resemble traditional
soldiers. Nonetheless, some have adopted a strict interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions and advanced the idea that al-Qaeda members
are civilians because they do not possess the above-mentioned
characteristics of true soldiers under the laws of war."
Civilians can only be targeted if they participate directly in the
hostilities. 45 The requirements of direct participation in hostilities are
not elaborated upon in either the Geneva Conventions or the
Additional Protocols. However, these requirements have been
discussed at length in a study by the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and in Israeli Supreme Court case law.46 According
41. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I), art. 43(2), Jan. 23 1979, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I].
42. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art.
4, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention III].
43. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(3).
44. See, e.g., Vogel, supra note 2, at 119 (concluding that "[m]embers of al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associates do not meet the requirements
of lawful combatancy, and therefore are unlawful combatants or
unprotected civilians" (footnote omitted)).
45. See Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(3).
46. See Wuschka, supra note 38, at 899.
206
CASEWEsTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAw -VOL. 45 -2012
The United States' Use of Drones in the War on Terror
to the ICRC study, direct participation contemplates a specific act,
and civilians lose protection against direct attacks as long as they are
participating in such specific hostile acts.47 To the contrary, members
of an armed group remain direct participants in the hostilities for the
entire duration of their membership in the given armed group,
because of their constant combat function.48 Under the ICRC
approach, al-Qaeda members could be targeted only if one could
prove that particular targets were directly engaged in the hostilities.
This view would seriously restrict the choice of targets and shed
further doubt on the legality of the entire drone program. Under the
Israeli Supreme Court approach, however, the relevant inquiry is
"whether civilians are performing the function of combatants."49
Civilians who only perform sporadic hostile acts are entitled to
protection from direct attacks once they detach themselves from such
acts. However, permanent members of terrorist groups lose their
civilian status and protection.,o Based on the Israeli Supreme Court
view, members of al-Qaeda could be targeted because they would
have lost civilian status through their membership in a terrorist
organization. While some scholars have supported this view, many
others have criticized it, and it is fair to assert that this view has not
reached unanimous approval in the international community.
Thus, if al-Qaeda members were considered civilians, they could
be targeted only if they participate directly in the hostilities; this
requirement has not been conclusively defined in international law
and each targeting operation would have to be carefully analyzed to
determine whether a particular individual could be targeted. It should
be noted that the Obama Administration has argued that individuals
who are part of an armed group are "belligerents and, therefore,
lawful targets under international law."51 The Obama Administration
has seemingly rejected the ICRC approach and adopted a more
aggressive tactic in determining which individuals can be targeted.
In addition to the debate over the status of al-Qaeda forces as
combatants versus civilians, some have advanced the idea that
members of al-Qaeda are unlawful combatants-that they do not
47. See NILs MELZER, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES
UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw 43-46 (2009).
48. See id. at 31-36 (discussing various criteria for membership in armed
groups).
49. Helen Keller and Magdalena Forowicz, A Tightrope Walk Between
Legality and Legitimacy: An Analysis of the Israeli Supreme Court's
Judgment on Targeted Killing, 21 LEIDEN J. INT'L. L. 185, 207 (2008).
50. HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel
53(4)PD 817, 39 [2005] (Isr.).
51. Koh, supra note 9, at 15.
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qualify as lawful combatants because they do not fight pursuant to
the rules of the laws of war, but that they do not qualify as civilians
either precisely because they are engaged in a fight against the United
States.52 According to Yoram Dinstein,
[A] person is not allowed to wear simultaneously two caps: the
hat of a civilian and the helmet of a soldier. A person who
engages in military raids by night, while purporting to be an
innocent civilian by day, is neither a civilian nor a lawful
combatant. He is an unlawful combatant. He is a combatant in
the sense that he can be lawfully targeted by the enemy, but he
cannot claim the privileges appertaining to lawful combatancy.
Nor does he enjoy the benefits of civilian status . . . ."
Under this view, members of al-Qaeda could be targeted, because
they are not civilians, but would not enjoy the protections the law of
war offers to lawful combatants. This view has not been immune to
criticism.' Moreover, this view appears asymmetrical and almost
unfair: on the one hand, it asserts that forces like al-Qaeda may be
liberally targeted as combatants, while on the other hand dictating
that they be deprived of any protections derived through combatant
status. Yoram Dinstein may be correct in his description of persons
who wear "two caps," but many would dispute his assertion that such
a person is neither civilian nor combatant. A better view may be to
either classify members of al-Qaeda as combatants or as civilians
participating directly in hostilities.
If one rejects the conclusion that the United States is engaged in
armed conflict against al-Qaeda, then any forceful action against al-
Qaeda targets would have to be analyzed through a law enforcement
paradigm and international human rights law would apply. Under this
approach, individuals could not be targeted unless the threat the
individuals pose is imminent and the targeting is necessary.5 Thus, as
stated above, the drone program would have to be deemed illegal
under this approach, because of impermissible targeting practices.
Finally, if targets of drone strikes are American citizens,
additional constitutional issues shed further scrutiny on the legality of
such attacks. Recently, an American citizen, Anwar al-Alwaki was
52. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 119.
53. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 29 (1st ed. 2004).
54. See, e.g., Marco Sassbli, Use and Abuse of the Laws of War in the "War
on Terrorism," 22 LAW & INEQ. 195, 208-10 (2004) (arguing no one can
fall between the protections of civilian status and lawful combatant
status and thus fail to be protected by either status).
55. See supra Part II on the applicability of international human rights law
to the use of drones and targeted killings.
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targeted and killed in a drone strike in Yemen." Many have criticized
the resort to targeted killings against a U.S. citizen."7 The U.S.
Constitution entitles all those it protects to due process." Attorney
General Holder stated in his speech in March 2012 that due process
did not equal judicial process, thereby implying that judicial oversight
and review was not necessary before the executive ordered the
targeted killing of an American citizen.59 This view has been heavily
criticized, and many have lamented that the executive, under this
view, determines who can be targeted, when and where, with no
judicial or other oversight. 0 Thus, if targets of drone strikes are
American citizens, the legality of such strikes becomes more dubious
and less politically and morally acceptable.
IV. LEGALITY OF DRONE STRIKES UNDER Jus IN BELLO?
The next question raised by the recent use of drones is one of jus
in bello: is the way in which drones are being used legal? The above
discussion on the definition of the battlefield and the identity of
targets raised issues of jus ad bellum, or the lawfulness of the entire
drone program. If one were to conclude that the program is not per se
illegal, one would nonetheless have to examine how and under what
circumstances drones were being used. This issue is one of jus in
bello.61
Jus in bello dictates that force may be used only if such use
respects the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and
humanity.62 The principle of military necessity requires that armed
attacks during wartime be limited to military objectives and offer a
56. See Al Qaeda's Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, supra note 19.
57. See Rebecca Nelson, Targeted Killing of U.S. Citizens Lawful, Says
Holder, but Critics Pounce, MEDILL NATIONAL SECURITY ZONE, http://
nationalsecurityzone.org/site/targeted-killing-of-u-s-citizens-lawful-says-
holder-but-critics-pounce/ (Mar. 19, 2012) (noting the widespread
criticism of Holder's asserted legal justifications for targeted killings of
U.S. citizens).
58. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
59. See Holder, supra note 21.
60. See, e.g., Nathan Freed Wessler, In Targeted Killing Speech, Holder
Mischaracterizes Debate over Judicial Review, ACLU BLOG OF RIGHTS,
http://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/targeted-killing-speech-
holder-mischaracterizes-debate-over-judicial-review(Mar. 5, 2012).
61. See, e.g., O'Connell, supra note 6, at 589 (noting the decision to use
drones is governed by jus ad bellum, but once drones are in use, they are
governed by jus in bello).
62. For a detailed discussion of the legality of the use of drones under jus in
bello, see Vogel, supra note 2, at 114-29.
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well-defined military advantage." Thus, only measures which are
"indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as
soon as possible" should be undertaken." The principle of
proportionality requires a complex analysis, "taking into account
factors such as the military importance or exigency of the target."'
Thus, Article 51(5) of Additional Protocol I prohibits "attack[s] which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated."6 Article 57, in addition, prohibits military
planners from launching attacks "which may be expected to cause
incidental . . . [but excessive] loss[es] . . . in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated."" The principle of
distinction requires that parties to a conflict distinguish at all times
between combatants and civilians, as well as between military and
civilian objects." In addition, this principle protects civilians from all
attacks, and prohibits indiscriminate attacks.69 However, the principle
of distinction does not forbid civilian casualties; rather, targeting
decisions "must avoid civilian casualties that are excessive in relation
to the anticipated military advantage." 0 In other words, the principle
of distinction permits targeting of individuals "who commit specific
acts likely to influence military action."7 Finally, the principle of
humanity generally prohibits parties to a conflict from using weapons
calculated to cause unnecessary suffering." "The principle of
humanity may be understood as the capstone of the other
constraining principles, requiring parties to a conflict to exercise
restraint when an act would cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
suffering, even it if meets the requirements of necessity, distinction,
and proportionality." 73
In sum, under jus in bello, force may be used if the military
objective sought is necessary, if the suffering caused by the use of
63. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 52(2).
64. U.S. ARMY LAW OF WAR HANDBOOK 164 (Maj. Keith E. Puls ed., 2005).
65. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT'L
L. 381, 395 (1997).
66. Protocol I, supra note 41, art. 51(5)(b).
67. Id. art. 57(2)(a)(iii).
68. Id. art. 48.
69. Id. art. 51(2)-(4).
70. Orr, supra note 31, at 748.
71. Id. at 749.
72. Protocol I, supra note 38, art. 35(2).
73. Vogel, supra note 2, at 127-28.
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force is proportionate to the military objective, if the military
commander can properly distinguish between military and non-
military targets, and if the military commander has adopted limited
means of injuring the enemy, which minimize unnecessary suffering. It
is possible that drones could, under carefully crafted circumstances,
satisfy the rules of jus in bello. For example, if a military commander
decided to launch a drone attack against a well-known military target,
if such a drone attack would advance significant military objectives, if
the drone attack would not harm civilians to a degree
disproportionate to the military objective sought, and if the drone
attack would not cause unnecessary suffering, such a drone attack
could comply with jus in bello. In fact, the Obama Administration has
claimed its drone program satisfies all the requirements of jus in bello
because "targeting particular individuals serves to narrow the focus
when force is employed and to avoid broader harm to civilians and
civilian objects."74 Due to the secrecy of the CIA-operated drone
program, this assertion unfortunately remains unverifiable.
Very few courts have ever dealt with the issue of the legality of
the use of drones under jus in bello. However, the International Court
of Justice has struggled with similarly difficult issues in its advisory
opinion on the legality of the use of nuclear weapons." The World
Court was unable to conclude that the use of nuclear weapons could
never satisfy the rules of international law." Similarly, it would be
hard to conclude that the use of drones could never satisfy the
requirements of jus in bello. However, it is likely that many already
launched drone attacks have failed to fulfill to these requirements,
and one could only hope that in the future, drone operators consider
such rules of jus in bello with most careful attention. Because, as
mentioned above, the drone program appears to be mainly operated
by the CIA and because very little information is publicly known
about the details of drone attacks, it is impossible to perform the jus
in bello analysis in order to assess the legality of particular strikes.
Media reports as to the number of attacks and number of civilian
casualties vary, prompting many in the international community to
call for more accountability on behalf of the Obama Administration.
74. Koh, supra note 9, at 15.
75. See generally Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,
Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 257 (July 8).
76. Id. 95. The ICJ concluded:
[In view of the current state of international law, and of the
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence,
in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.
Id. 105(E).
211
CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW -VOL. 45-2012
The United States' Use of Drones in the War on Terror
If the Administration is correct in its assessment that the drone
program satisfies jus in bello requirements, then it should provide
more information to the public about the program. Secrecy in this
context reinforces the sense of illegitimacy.
V. LOCATION AND IDENTITY OF DRONE OPERATORS
The final question raised by the drone program has to do with
drone operators themselves. Some have alleged the United States
conducts two separate drone programs: one by the military and the
other by the CIA." If drone operators are members of American
armed forces, then they are lawful combatants who enjoy all the
protections accorded to such status by the Geneva Conventions."
More importantly, perhaps, members of the armed forces are trained
in the use of force, know when and how force can be used, and are
subject to disciplinary action if they do not follow such rules.7 1 CIA
operatives, on the other hand, are not lawful combatants and do not
enjoy any Geneva Convention protections; they are either civilians or
unlawful enemy combatants, as discussed above in the context of the
status of al-Qaeda members. 0 CIA operatives are not trained in the
use of force and do not face court-martial or other disciplinary action.
In fact, the CIA drone program has been secret, and no particular
information regarding the specifics of the program has ever been
publicly disclosed." The identity of the operators may not be
dispositive of all the legal issues discussed above. However, the
selection of drone operators as CIA personnel rather than then
members of U.S. armed forces may reflect a particular political choice
and may, unfortunately, cast more doubt about the legitimacy and
lawfulness of the entire drone program.
Further, the location of drone operators may pose additional
questions regarding the lawfulness of drone operations. Although the
CIA program has been largely secret, reports have surfaced that drone
operators tend to be located in the United States, far away from
battle fields in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, or Yemen.8 1 Some
77. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 3.
78. See Vogel, supra note 2, at 136 (discussing the obligation of members of
the armed forces to abide by the laws of war, thus securing law of war
protections for themselves).
79. See id.
80. Vogel, supra note 2, at 134-35.
81. Id. at 135-36 (noting that regarding CIA operation of drones, "the
public does not know what rules apply and neither does the enemy, in
contrast to the military's requirement for transparency in promulgating
its rules and regulations").
82. Id. at 132.
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have criticized this phenomenon by arguing that warfare has turned
into a video game, where lethal weapons are launched through the
click of a button.n A drone operator tucked away into the safety of
CIA offices in Nevada or Arizona deploys highly dangerous arms
which can cause hundreds of deaths in a matter of seconds, without
any risk to the operator or any of his or her associates.4 As Army
Chaplain D. Keith Shurtleff has noted, "as wars become safer and
easier, as soldiers are removed from the horrors of war and see the
enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is a very real
danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide."' The fact
that war has become dehumanized and human casualties eliminated
for the drone operator side leads some to question whether war has
become too easy and whether decisions to engage in lethal operations
will be taken too lightly." Thus, "an obscure . . . computer-human
status issue" may be emerging in this area;" possible questions
include whether a computer can truly make life of death decisions,
whether the absence of a human in a lethal military operation may
remove all deterrents to violations of the laws of war, and whether
human judgment is necessary to exercise restraint in situations of
armed conflict.
While jus ad bellum and jus in bello do not contain any particular
requirements regarding the location of drone operators, it is fair to
assume that when these rules were drafted, remotely operated
weapons like drones were not contemplated. Thus, it is arguable that
while jus ad bellum and jus in bello do not contain prohibitions on the
use of drones remotely operated from places far away from actual
conflicts, newly developed weapons like drones may require
development of better-suited rules of armed conflict for the future.
Certainly, the use of remotely operated weapons like drones poses
questions of a moral and humanitarian magnitude, which the rule of
law should also contemplate in the near future.
83. See id. at 133 (noting that commentators have compared the operation
of drones to a video game); Orr, supra note 31, at 735 (noting that
"'[plilots' in the United States control the drones using joysticks").
84. Orr, supra note 31, at 735 (noting that "an obvious advantage of the
program is the lack of risk to an on-board pilot").
85. P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 396 (2009).
86. See id. ("Otherwise nice and normal people create psychic doubles that
carry out sometimes terrible acts that their normal identity would never
do . . . . These weapons don't just create greater physical distance, but
also a different sort of psychological distance and disconnection.").
87. Vogel, supra note 2, at 136.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The use of drones to perform targeted killings in remote locations
of Pakistan and Yemen is riddled with difficult legal questions. These
questions have been impossible to answer because of the secrecy
surrounding the CIA drone program. If the United States is truly
engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces, it can be argued that drone attacks are not per se
illegal, and that, if performed under carefully elaborated rules and
guidelines, they could satisfy the relevant rules of jus in bello. Issues
that remain unanswered are those regarding the nature of the conflict
that the United States has been engaged in since 9/11, as well as
those regarding the details of CIA-led drone operations, without
which rules of jus in bello cannot be analyzed. The Obama
Administration, as well as any future administrations, should consider
installing military-led drone operations, which would be subject to
public scrutiny to ensure that the rule of law remains the guiding
principle of U.S. use of force abroad.
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